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| Simulation Research on the Incentive Strategy in Scientific Research Data Sharing and Expected Revenue Analysis between Researchers and Sharing Intermediaries |
| Gao Xiaoning1,2, Gao Mingzhu1 |
1.School of Information Management, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001
2.Research Center of Data Science, Zhengzhou 450001 |
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Abstract In the process of scientific research data sharing, intermediaries tend to lack the willingness to truly convey information about data quality and requirements, leading to hidden dangers such as low efficiency of scientific research data sharing and researchers taking most of the risks. Based on the principal-agent theory, this study investigates the relationship of interest game between data sharing intermediaries and researchers, introduces the revenue sharing coefficient to restrain the non-standard behaviors of data sharing intermediaries, then constructs an incentive mechanism of both parties to share risks, and solves the optimal incentive strategy. The conclusions of this study provide management inspirations and decision support for scientific research personnel. Research indicates that the expected returns of researchers are concave to the incentive coefficient, and those of shared intermediaries are concave functions of their efforts. This reveals the existence of an optimal revenue sharing coefficient that enables data sharing intermediaries to transmit the real information of sharing process according to the wishes of the researchers. Moreover, the optimal incentive strategy also changes dynamically with the change of shared intermediary cost input, risk aversion degree, random factor, and other parameters.
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Received: 26 July 2022
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